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Introduction 
While corrupt activities are never easy to assess, this is 
even more true if the receiver of the bribe is a judge. 
Perhaps that explains why Transparency International 
does not have a special section on judicial corruption, 
and why there is so little literature on the issue (cfYonaba 
1997: 87-98). Such a dearth of information is remark-
able if we take into account that corruption generally 
is at the center of the international movement for good 
governance, not to mention the fact that so many reports, 
books, workshops, lectures and programs are dedicated 
to the issue (Taylor 2002: 40-42). 
The main reason judicial corruption is so hard to as-
sess, I suppose, is that the judicial process is of a so-called 
triadic nature: It involves not two but three parties (Shapiro 
1981), with two of the three in an adversarial position. 1 
While competition between parties before a public official 
occurs in many constellations - for instance in tender 
procedures - it is never as clear-cut as in the case oflitiga-
tion, where the only reason to involve a third party is the 
other two's inability to solve their conflict on their own. 
And obviously a party who has paid the bribe will try to 
conceal his act in order not to endanger his pOSition in any 
future proceedings. Those involved in the "triad" usually 
do not like to talk about this part of their "business," at 
least not while the relationship still exists or if there is a 
prospect of renewed involvement in the future. 
Another reason has to do with the nature of the judicial 
office: No other official is held to the standards ofirnpar-
tiality required of a judge (Becker 1970: 26). Impartiality 
is the very essence of judicial office,2 even if it has long 
been established that courts are political institutions (Sha-
piro 1964), and that judges usually represent to some de-
gree the interests of the ruling elite (e.g., Griffith 1991).3 
A judge who fails to maintain his iropartiality will soon 
lose his legitimacy in the eyes of society. It is no wonder 
that the requirement ofiropartiality permeates legal educa-
tion and is a basic cornerstone of the rule oflaw'Thus, by 
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profession judges are particularly sensitive about this issue, 
which has become a crucial element of their professional 
integrity (see also Bedner 2001: 235). 
The final reason I would like to cite has to do with the 
nature of judicial conflict resolution, and maintains that 
the law is not always as straightforward as we would like 
it to be. It is often very difficult to tell from a judgment 
whether the judge has been subject to monetary or other 
improper influences in reaching his conclusion because 
the law is unclear, which. of course, is often the reason 
in the first place why parties take a case to court.s This 
problem is particularly evident in legal systems that are 
not fully developed, where legislation may be unavailable 
or case law inaccessible (Churchill 1992, Pompe 1996, 
Yonaba 1997, Al-Zwaini forthcoming), or where in the 
course of the transition from a colonial to a post-colonial 
state, the coherence of the entire system may have been 
undermined by ruptures in the relationship between le-
gal texts (Massier forthcoming). In summary, the absence 
of clear rules obscures what the judge is dOing. 
The question of how difficult it is to aSSess whether 
there is a case of judiCial corruption further depends on 
how you define this concept. Do you speak of judicial 
corruption only if a judge produces a certain judgment 
after receiving an amount of money from a stakeholder 
and it is the money that determines this outcome, or 
do you choose to include other cases as well? For the 
purpose of this essay I define corruption rather narrowly: 
There is a case of corruption if a judge accepts money 
or services from a party to a dispute. that may influence 
his decision in a case at hand.6 
Having established some of the basic issues underly-
ing my argument, I will now try to shed light on the 
consequences and causes of judiCial corruption, and look 
at a few major obstacles confronting reformers. 
The follOwing questions will gUide my inquiry: 
• What are the effects of judicial corruption on judg-
ments? 
How bad is judicial corruption for the legitimacy of 
the state and economic development? 
• What makes judges corrupt? 
How can you reduce judicial corruption? 
Consequences 
What are the effects of judicial corruption on judg-
ments? 
As I have already indicated, this question is difficult to 
answer because often the law does not point straight-
away at a certain outcome. Nonetheless, we can at least 
structure an examination by distinguishing various 
categories of influence. 
On one side of the effects scales, we find cases where 
the judgment is in clear conflict with the law. Although 
one has to be careful not to draw any rash conclusions 
- the causes may also lie with insufficient legal training 
or judges may have been subject to political pressure - in 
many such cases corruption is the cause of the judicial 
decision. Good cases to illustrate this point are various 
judgments from the Indonesian commercial courts. 
These were established in the wake of the 1997198 crisis 
to create a reliable process to pronounce bankruptcies 
and thereby settle the huge amount of bad debts in the 
private sector. 
Several features of the commercial court make them 
an ideal research object for the purpose of judiCial cor-
ruption. First, bankruptcy proceedings all over the world 
are often more of an administrative procedure than an 
adversarial lawsuit, and as regards the conditions for 
pronouncing a bankruptcy, bankruptcy law is not the 
most intricate of legal fields. Second, the courts were to 
apply a new Law on Bankruptcy (Government Regula-
tion in lieu ofLaw No. 1 of 1998), specially drafted for 
this purpose and which apparently proVided much legal 
certainty.Third, unlike most judgments in Indonesia, the 
judgments of the commercial courts are all published and 
accessible to a wide audience. This was supposed to lead 
to a clear case law based on precedent. And finally, the 
judges for the commercial courts were specially selected 
and given a thorough training course. The main drafter 
of the Bankruptcy Law was one of the teachers. 7 
These measures failed to promote good judgments, 
but they were quite successful in producing transparent 
bad administration of justice. Legal scholarly analyses of 
commercial court judgments have shown that the judges 
refuse to apply the law in a straightforward marmer and 
have produced a range of incomprehensible judgments 
(Tahyar 1999, Lindsey 2000). While in certain cases 
political considerations may very well have replaced 
money as an incentive - in particular in the cases against 
parts of the huge conglomerates - in others there are 
no grounds whatsoever to assume that the judges were 
under political pressure. In these cases, bribery seems 
to be the Single explanation left. 
This is shown most clearly by the widely publicized 
Manulife case, where out of the blue the judges declared 
the Indonesian subsidiary of Canadian insurance giant 
Manulife bankrupt, because in 1998 it would have failed 
to pay dividends to its former Indonesian partner PT 
Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera (Hukumonline.com, June 6, 2002). 
In fact, it was obvious to anyone with some knowledge 
of the case that this claim lacked any legal grounds and 
that the whole suit was only a way for PT DSS to bring 
pressure on Manulife ill the negotiations over the con-
sequences of the split (Backman 2002). In this case the 
judges of the Jakarta commercial court had miscalculated 
the effects of their actions. Worldwide negative reactions 
to the Manulife judgment brought such pressure on the 
Indonesian government and judiciary that, in a most 
unusual move, the Supreme Court launched an investi-
gation into allegations of corruption which led to the 
suspension of three of the judges involved in the court 
proceedings (Hukumonline.com,June 21,2002).8 
While this is probably the kind of effect most people 
think of in relation to judiCial corruption, the opposite 
also happens, and probably more often: The judge does 
receive a gift or a favor. But it has no influence on the 
outcome of the case, nor is it visible from the judgment. 
It can only be assessed from a combination oflegal analy-
sis and field research in and around courthouses, which 
is quite a rare form ofresearch.9 
There are several ways to explain the "bribe paid to 
no visible effect" cases. One is that both parties to a 
dispute negotiate with the judge to win a case. Judges 
who attempt to maintain at least a degree of integrity 
or impartiality may judge a case on its legal merits and 
accept the money from the party whose case they think 
is strongest (Bedner 2001: 236). Obviously, in situations 
where the law is less clear, the discretionary power of 
the judge increases and the nature of the negotiations 
may shift towards a bidding competition." 
An obvious side effect of this development is that 
judges take their decisions regarding the outcome of a 
case at a very early stage of the procedure (Bedner 2001 : 
239-40). Consequently, even if there is no intention on 
the part of the judges to let the money determine the 
outcome, they are tempted to take a decision based on 
perfunctory knowledge of the case. Information acquired 
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in court sessions then no longer serves to guide the 
judge, while evidentiary problems will be dismissed. 
It is on this slippery slope towards a complete loss 
of integrity that another effect of corruption on the 
administration of justice becomes visible: It changes 
the nature of the procedure. This change relates to the 
triadic configuration, which is a sensitive one, and the 
legitimacy of the judge in the eyes of the parties. II While 
any losing party or his lawyer has a natural tendency to 
blame the judge for his decision (Shapiro 1981, Genn 
1999: 202-04), this becomes even more salient when 
suspicions of corruption are "in the air." This struck me 
several times during my research on the Indonesian ad-
ministrative courts, when in cases where I was convinced 
that the judges had produced a correct judgment the 
negative outcome was nevertheless blamed on the judges 
having been bribed (Bedner 2001: 241-42). In such an 
atmosphere judges tend to sustain their legitimacy by 
enhancing the feeling of procedural fairness. This may 
actually be highly detrimental to the effiCiency of the 
procedure in terms of time and money. In the Indone-
sian administrative courts it led to interminable sessions 
during which parties were allowed to elucidate their 
points of view up to four times. The endless testimonies 
bore hardly any relation to the (legal) core of the matter 
(Bedner 200 I: 245). 
Having structured to some degree the effects of judi-
cial corruption on the judicial process and its outcome, 
I will now look at the wider social and economic ef-
fects of the phenomenon. This leads me to the second 
question: 
How bad is judicial corruption for economic 
development?12 
To answer this question we need to make a brief detour 
first, to look at the conditions for economic develop-
ment that could relate to judicial corruption. These, I 
would argue, include first and foremost legal certainty, 
which more or less requires a state that is legitimate in 
the eyes of the majority of the population. However, 
legal certainty is not the only type of certainty foster-
ing entrepreneurial trl.lst (as that is what we are mostly 
talking about in the context of economic development 
in capitalist systems). During the early 1990s, a whole 
body ofliterature developed to explain Asia's economic 
success as based on a type of capitalism supported by au-
thoritarian states,I3 not on strong judiciaries. One could 
say that in these states the certainty required for business 
expansion was provided by the executive instead of the 
judiciary. However, the main beneficiaries of the system 
16 
were large businesses and foreign investors, while smaller 
domestic industries suffered from high costs associated 
with this type of rule. 14 
The problems of such a system became evident when 
the crisis overtook Asia in 1997/98 and foreign invest-
ment dropped to an unprecedented ebb. In several of 
the countries concerned, severe problems with setding 
private debt emerged and investors lost much or all of 
their appetite for the region. While South Korea, Thailand 
and Malaysia in the end managed to restore investor con-
fidence, Indonesia failed to do so, in large part because 
the government was unwilling or unable to reform the 
judiciary. This at least points in the direction of legal 
certainty having advantages over "executive certainty" 
in fostering economic development. 
A related point is that economic poliCies laid down 
in law will largely fail if tt.ere is no judiciary to imple-
ment them. Courts are not only dispute resolvers - and 
according to some authors they are even very bad dispute 
resolvers (Galanter 1981: 3-4) - but they have a major 
task in creating "the shadow of the law" (Mnookin and 
Kornhauser 1979), or in granting citizens a "regulatory 
endowment" (Galanter 1981: 8-9). This all means that 
the courts are crucial to sustaining the general expecta-
tion that the law will be implemented, and this is an 
important incentive in structuring social action. 
The absence of an impartial judge can also have 
unsettling effects on social cohesion. When no alterna-
tive system of certainty is in place, neither are disputes 
resolved nor is there any systematic implementation of 
law or government policies. In the worst case the situa-
tion will start to resemble a Hobbesian state of "Warre" 
(Henley 2002). Clearly, under such conditions there is 
not much of an incentive to undertake any meaningful 
economic activities. 
However, while there obViously is a link between 
an impartial judge and economic development, there 
is no such thing as a shortcut from judicial corruption 
to bad economic performance, even if we disregard 
the aVailability of alternative systems of certainty. Many 
tend to overlook that what really matters from a macro 
perspective is whether a large proportion of the popu-
lation is convinced that judicial corruption is a reality, 
not whether this conviction is supported by empirical 
facts." If we carry on this thought, we must conclude 
that there is a tenuous connection between general trust 
in the judiCiary and trust by parties having had litigation 
experiences (cf Bruinsma 1999).In short, legal certainty 
viewed from an economic angle exists if there is a degree 
of general trust in the judiciary's capacity to implement 
the law, while it does not matter much whether actual 
litigation experience confirms this perception. 16 
Nonetheless, if corruption persists on a certain scale 
it will inevitably emerge at some point and taint the 
image of the judiciary It is likely, though, that public 
convictions are slower than practice and therefore it may 
take time to tarnish the judiciary's image, but restoration 
will be slow. 
Causes 
Having discussed some consequences of judicial corrup-
tion, I will now look at its origins. I suggest starting at 
the grassroots, or micro, level by asking: 
What makes judges corrupt? 
It is tempting to take a shortcut to matters such as judi-
cial salaries in answering this question, but for a proper 
understanding one needs to realize that while judicial 
corruption may start as an isolated decision by an indi-
vidual, widespread corruption is a social phenomenon. 
At a certain point judges are socialized into becoming 
corrupt. A judge who does not play along runs the risk 
of becoming an outcast, may gamble away his chances 
of promotion and is likely to leave the judicial profession 
altogether. Being a maverick is never easy, and particu-
larly not if one serves as a living reminder oflost ideals 
and integrity. 
The importance of acknowledging that corruption 
may become part of the organizational culture of a court 
of course lies in the fact that organizational culture is 
highly resistant to change. Tackling the problems un-
derlying judicial corruption is simply not enough. The 
courts themselves are not isolated, but are situated in an 
environment that may constitute an important part of 
the problem. Very recently a member of the Indonesian 
Supreme Court and a former professor of public law, 
Laica Marzuki, referred to this issue when he claimed that 
.. 7 0% of the problems with judicial corruption can be 
solved by disciplining advocates" (The Jakarta Post,lanuary 
25, 2003). Unfortunately, he offered no suggestions as 
to why it would be easier to discipline advocates than 
judges. But his statements clearly indicated that corrup-
tion does not take place in isolation. On the contrary, 
in many cases there have been long-standing relations 
between judges and advocates that are hard to change,let 
alone cut off (cf Bedner 2002: 240-41). Similar ties exist 
between judges and prosecutors and between judges and 
government representatives who often appear in court 
(Bedner 2002: 242-244). 
Nonetheless, socialization of corruption is not a self-
driven process, but likely to occur under the following 
conditions: 
1) Unclear boundaries between the public and private 
spheres 
The first condition is that the public and private spheres 
are not clearly demarcated. In many countries personal 
and public/professional relations are closely interwoven, 
which makes it more difficult for an official to refuse 
professional services for private purposes. I! This may 
even be officially condoned, as for instance in the Neth-
erlands, where judges may hold positions on company 
boards of commissioners, a practice usually defended 
with the argument that this keeps judges" aware of the 
real world." Usually, though, the form of such a fusion 
of private and public is less transparent than in this par-
ticular example. The limits of this practice are to a large 
extent determined by general social perceptions of what 
is proper behavior, and by the education judges receive 
in this respect. 18 
2) Needs 
A second condition promoting corruption is that judges 





range from truly basic ones such as money for housing, 
medical treatment and transport, to maintaining the de-
corum of the status group the judiciary aspires to be part 
of. The latter issue is complex, as status groups are not so 
easy to define. The concept denotes a common lifestyle, 
based on "an effective claim to social esteem in terms 
of positive or negative privileges" (Weber 1978: 929, 
quoted in Swartz 1997: 150). To sustain this lifestyle, 
members of a status group draw from both economic 
and "symbolic" capital (Bourdieu 1966: 213, quoted in 
Swartz 1997: 151). 
While economic capital always plays a role in deter-
rn.in.:illg status, the various resources constituting sym-
bolic capital are not of equal weight under all circum-
stances. For instance, in societies where rapid transitions 
take place, elements such as descent from a noble family 
tend to lose importance. Similarly, holding judiCial office 
in itself diminishes as a symbolic capital resource under 
conditions where the judiCiary as a political actor is re-
duced, as happened in Indonesia during the 195 Os and 
1960s (Lev 1966). Under such conditions, I would argue 
that the relative importance of money as a determinant 
of social status increases. 
This has two adverse effects on the judiciary. First, it 
reduces the attractiveness of the office for fresh recruits, 
but a related process is loss of self-esteem and erosion 
of professional values. "Why would I still bother to be a 
honest judge when my office is looked down upon and 
my income is lower than that of any other legal profes-
sional?" Second, while this transition is still underway 
and the judiCial office has retained some of its value as 
symbolic capital, judges feel the need to maintain the 
status and living standards of the social group they aspire 
to remam part of - and this often requires more money 
than they earn. 
3) Absence of and Incomplete Legal Information 
The third condition promoting judiCial corruption has 
to do with the nature of the legal system. Although no 
one argues anymore that the judge is ouly "la bouche 
de la loi," judges are at least bound to some degree by 
law (Tamanaha 1997: 228-44). Legal clarity (an ele-
ment of legal certainty) has two sides, a legal and an 
institutional one. The legal is most obvious: Iflegislators 
produce unclear laws and if judges produce judgments 
that are hard to use as guidelines for subsequent judg-
ments, the discretionary power of judges in individual 
cases increases. This obviously makes it easier for judges 
to conceal influence from corruption on the outcome 
of a case. 
18 
The institutional side - often overlooked by academic 
lawyers - is the actual availability of legal information. 
No matter how brilliant a law or a judgment, it cannot 
serve as a source of law if it remains unknown to the 
judiciary or advocates. In many countries this is the pre-
vailing condition: New laws remain shelved in ministries 
or even in parliament (AI Zwaini forthcoming), and no 
one bothers to publish judgments (to the extent that even 
parties can hardly get a copy [Churchill 1994: 12]), let 
alone discuss their impact in legal journals. 
The problem is that once corruption has entered the 
courts, a vicious circle develops as corrupt judges hold a 
personal stake in maintaining their discretionary power. 
This allows them to play off one party against the other 
and conceal the true motive behind a judgment. 
4) Imperfect Legal Edncation and Differences 
in Legal Style 
This condition is closely intertwined with the previous 
one. Even if good legal information is available, one needs 
good jurists to apply it and in many countries these are 
in short supply. Decolonization has often caused painful 
ruptures with the legal past and various generations of 
jurists share different "bodies of text" in their profes-
sional activities (Massier forthcoming). j-[owever, there 
are obviously more mundane reasons, including over-
crowded university classrooms, lack of materials, courses 
that are too short (see for instance Budiardjo et al. 1997: 
61), and perhaps even corruption within universities19 
Lack of proper education leads to insufficient skills in 
legal reasoning and, consequently, to judgments that are 
either difficult or impossible to understand. 
To this one may add the marked differences in legal 
culture. While the Anglo-Saxon legal style20 and the 
German one require extensive reasons given for a judg-
ment, this is certainly not the case for the Latin-French 
tradition (Zweigert and Kiitz 1996: 126-27,271-72). 
As these traditions have been carried over into the COlUl-
tries' former colonies, the differences in style have had 
worldwide consequences, usually t9 the advantage of 
the former British colonies, I would say. 
Lack of'fiansparency in Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP) 
Although judges are traditionally viewed as a sub-species 
of the tortoise, operating singlehandedly and shielded 
from their surroundings by protective shells, this im-
age is clearly false. All over the world judges are part of 
organizations and the way these organizations are run to 
a large extent determines what judges do and how they 
do it. Wlllle I have touched on some of these aspects in 
previous sections, the SOP in the court deserve special at-
tention in the context of judicial corruption, as they have 
a direct impact on the way justice is administered. 
The first type of rules concerns the allotment of cases. 
The basic system may vary from a monopoly in the hands 
of the court's chairman to the random selection of cases 
for councils of judges. The former type offers more pos-
sibilities for influencing corrupt activities, but whether 
it promotes or discourages corruption depends entirely 
on the chairman. Chairmen may use their power to send 
"wet" cases to judges they know will not engage in cor-
rupt activities, but they may also monopolize corruption, 
sending cases with a message and part of the bribe to a 
selected council of judges (Bedner 2001: 224). 
The way this system works much depends on the 
number of cases presented to the court. The higher the 
number of cases, the more difficult for a chairman to 
supervise what is happening in his ecurtY 
The second type of rule is closely tied to the previous 
one and pertains to the composition of the councils of 
judges, councils being the most usual entity to admin-
ister justice in modern courts. Here the basic forms are 
more variable, running from councils handpicked on the 
basis of personal criteria (similar to the ones sketched 
above), to "traditional" councils composed of a senior 
. judge and two junior ones, to a rotation system. The 
influence of these systems on the occurrence of corrup-
tion is much like in the first case: Handpicked councils 
offer the greatest opportunity for exerciSing influence, 
while the openness of traditional systems to corruption 
largely depends on the senior judge presiding over the 
council (Bedner 2001: 222-23). Rotating councils are 
more difficult to evaluate. While one could argue that 
they tend to spread corrupt activities by increasing the 
chances of "contamination," the system may also con-
tain this by preventing mechanisms of corruption from 
becoming habitual. 
A less clear-cut part of SOP are the rules regarding 
the reward of merit. One reason for this higher degree 
of complexity is that the issue takes us beyond the con-
finement of the Single court. Whether merit is rewarded 
or not translates into judicial careers within the whole 
judicial system, not within the court. 
However, in their capacity as supervisors. in particular 
of junior judges, chairmen can once again exercise great 
influence over the occurrence of corruption in their CQurt 
(Bedner 2001: 221-26). Iflegal merit is translated into 
a prosperous career, this may at least deter judges from 
graduating from illegal gifts to selling judgments to the 
highest bidder. However, I would argue that reinforcing 
attention to legal reasoning might keep judges aware at 
least to some degree of major values imbued in the law 
itself, such as impartiality, social justice, etc. 
Of course, this only works if merit is rewarded 
throughout the career management within the entire 
court system. Efforts by individual chairmen are pointless 
if their policies are not followed up. A good example at 
the highest level are the promotions and transfers that 
were decided by Indonesian Chief Justice Subekti, but 
left unimplemented by the Justice Department (Pompe 
1996: 93). 
Another condition for merit to work is that supervi-
sors use clear standards. Preferably there should be the 
possibility of appeal against an unfavorable evaluation 
of one's performance. The same applies to the rewards 
proVided. As long as an official promotion is effectively 
a punishment - for instance, when the court to which 
one is promoted is officially at a higher level but per-
ceived as unattractive because it is located in a backwater 
- mismanagement is concealed and therefore hard to 
address (Bedner 2001: 206). 
The last type of SOP I want to pay attention to are very 
mundane, but need to be addressed nonetheless. Conduct-
ing corrupt transactions is made far easier if judges have 
Single rooms, if they are allowed to receive visitors who 
are involved in cases or intend to br~g cases, and if their 
home addresses are provided to whoever asks for them. 
While in thoroughly corrupted surroundings issues like 
these may not matter much, they do when the court has 
only been" contaminated" to a limited extent. 
Remedies 
How can you reduce corruption? 
Most of the answer to this question automatically follows 
from my analysis in the previous sections: First you have 
to change the conditions that promote corruption. But 
this is no guarantee of success. 22 
The main caveat is that judicial corruption as a social-
ized phenomenon takes time to be eraclicated,·because it 
takes time to change behavior. This behavior is embed-
ded in the way a court functions, and it requires well-
thought-out strategies based on individual circumstances 
to address this issue. One needs in-depth knowledge of 
a court. 
This brings me to the second caveat that courts afe 
not independent entities acting in isolation from the rest 
of the legal system. Judges deal with advocates who are 
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part of the problem because they usually pay the bribe 
for their clients, in the process probably pocketing part 
of it themselves (Bedner 2001: 236).The sarue applies to 
government agencies: in the first place to public prosecu-
tors, but also to representatives of government agencies 
who may well have the official or unofficial power to 
impose their will on the courtS.23 This also helps explain 
why recent attempts to establish new and "clean" com-
mercial courts in Indonesia ended in failure. 
I will conclude with three obstacles that render at-
tempts at redUCing corruption useless. If these are in 
place, do not even try. 
Substantial parts of the government and the legislature 
have an interest in maintaining a corrupt judiciary 
In this case only half-hearted attempts can be expected. I 
admit that perhaps this is too bleak a picture, and that it 
can be more positive if the government has only limited 
powers over the management of the judiCiary. However, 
in particular if it is only pressure from the international 
community that will start the process and keep it going, 
the chance of success is slim. 
The corrupt top of the judiciary cannot be replaced 
Fish rot from the head, but restoration does not start at 
the -grassroots. As I have indicated above, CQurts are part 
of a wider system and if career management based on 
merit is not taken seriously at the top of the judiCiary, 
corruption will continue to prevail. Nor should one 
underestimate the effects of a lost "sense of mission" 
if lower court judges know that the top of the judicial 
pyramid earns heaps of money from illegal transac-
tions. It is therefore a sine qua non to establish a clean 
Supreme Court. 
No investments are made in good legal education and 
familiarity with the rule oflaw ideology 
If legal education is not taken seriously, there will not 
be good judges. Although it is difficult to prove, I am 
convinced that the lack of legal profeSSional skills leads 
to lower self-esteem and a lack of profeSSional pride, and 
that these make judges more prone to corruption. This 
also applies to the wider legal environment in which 
judges operate. I do recognize that there is a kind of vi-
cious circle at work here: Students of law will not work 
very hard if they perceive that corruption within the 
judiCiary in a way makes a mockery out of their efforts 
to master the law. On the other hand, if no efforts at 
improvement are made at this level, there will never be 
a profeSSionally self-confident judiciary. 
20 
If one thing may have become clear by now, it is that 
judicial corruption has many faces and aspects. This 
essay has tried to unveil a number of them and in the 
course of doing so, it may have inspired in you a degree 
of hopelessness as regards the possibilities of reducing 
corruption. This was in no way my intention. Instead, I 
have aimed to show that the fight against judicial cor-
ruption is complex and should not be underestimated. 
Thus, some insight from those who deal with this issue 
profeSSionally may serve to save others from unexpected 
disappointment. 
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Notes 
While this model is derived from civil procedure, it can equally 
be applied to criminal or administrative procedures, even if in 
that case a state agency is one of the parties. 
2 For an elegant elaboration of this theme in the colonial context, 
see Henley 2002. 
3 The seminal argument goes back to Marx, of course. 
4 Usually authors refer to the independence of the judge, not impar-
tiality, when discussing the rule of law. To my mind, impartiality 
is the major manifestation of judicial independence during the 
judicial process. For a discussion of this subject, see Schmidhauser 
1987. 
5 However, there has been a tendency to overestimate the degree 
of discretion a judge possesses (Tamanaha 1997: 228-44). 
6 The use of "may" allows me to exclude the need to establish a 
causal relation betw"een the bribe and the outcome, which is in 
any case difficult and would prevent me from discussing the more 
subtle influences of corruption. 
7 See the special issue of the Indonesian Law and Administration Review, No. 
1,1998, andIJndsey 2000. 
8 TIle case is still pending. 
9 At least in courthouses where corrupt practices occur. 
10 According to one of my respondents, an important threshold on 
the way from integrity to "becoming a devil" was the point where 
judges themselves would start to ask parties for money (interview 
with a Semarang administrative court judge, October 1994). 
11 The fear of attracting few litigants may also play a part. 
12 It is on purpose that I limit myself to the effects on economic 
development. While I certainly conceive of development as a 
process encompassing the pursuit of several objectives such as 
social justice, good public health, rule of law, etc. (Otto 1999: 
18), the relationship betw"een judicial corruption and economic 
development is of particular importance. 
13 See, for instance, ]ayasuriya 1999. 
14 Obviously this type of certainty has a price, too (see, for example, 
Braadbaart 1996). 
15 This is the so-called Thomas theory: It is not so much what hap-
pens as what people think happens that matters from a sociolOgical 
point of view. 
16 On legal certainty in developing countries, see also OUo 2002. 
17 This situation actually underlies the policy in many countries of 
transferring officials and judges (De Zwart 1996). 
18 It is interesting to note that lending judicial services in exchange 
for money is a marker of the transition from caste to class (Riggs 
2000). Lending service to relatives and relations is in fact more 
exclusionary than doing the same for anyone who pays. 
19 Personal communications from law students from various uni-
versities in Indonesia (July 1999 and August 2001). 
20 For the notion of style, see Zweigert and Kotz 1992: 63-75. 
21 But the higher the number of cases, one could argue, the less of 
a need to squeeze money out of all of them. 
22 One rather efficient general measure I want to add is to put 
judges under the obligation to list their wealth and to establish 
an independent agency to check this, as was recently done in 
Indonesia. 
23 A good example is the current situation in Italy, where the Berlus-
coni government pushes through legislation specifically aimed at 
protecting the Prime Minister from judidaI trials (NRC Handelsblad, 
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